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Abstract This paper presents an analysis of competition between generators
when incentive-based demand response is employed in an electricity market.
Thermal and hydropower generation are considered in the model. A smooth
inverse demand function is designed using a sigmoid and two linear functions
for modeling the consumer preferences under incentive-based demand response
program. Generators compete to sell energy bilaterally to consumers and sys-
tem operator provides transmission and arbitrage services. The profit of each
agent is posed as an optimization problem, then the competition result is found
by solving simultaneously Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions for all generators.
A Nash-Cournot equilibrium is found when the system operates normally and
at peak demand times when DR is required. Under this model, results show
that DR diminishes the energy consumption at peak periods, shifts the power
requirement to off-peak times and improves the net consumer surplus due to
incentives received for participating in DR program. However, the generators
decrease their profit due to the reduction of traded energy and market prices.
Keywords Incentive-based demand response · game theory · Cournot
equilibrium
1 Introduction
Demand Response (DR) is a program to motivate changes in electricity usage
by customers in response to changes in the price signal. DR is implemented
J. Vuelvas
Departamento de Electro´nica, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana,
Bogota´, Colombia.
E-mail: vuelvasj@javeriana.edu.co
F. Ruiz
Departamento de Electro´nica, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana,
Bogota´, Colombia.
E-mail: ruizf@javeriana.edu.co
2 Jose´ Vuelvas, Fredy Ruiz
by system operator (SO) to match the load with power generation in a smart
grid. Advanced metering at distribution side is required to implement a DR
program (Aketi and Sen, 2014). The main application is to decrease the load
at peak times in order to guarantee power availability and security on electrical
grid (Zhu et al., 2013; Bloustein, 2005; Su and Kirschen, 2009). The aim is to
control noncritical loads at residential, commercial and industrial levels for
balancing supply and demand. Broadly speaking, there are two ways to active
DR: direct control (e.g. load shedding or set-point based solutions) (Diaz et al.,
2017) and indirect methods (such as price-based programs) (Vuelvas and Ruiz,
2017).
There are some DR programs implemented as part of strategies to re-
duce peak power. In (Vardakas et al., 2015; Deng et al., 2015; Siano, 2014;
Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008; Madaeni and Sioshansi, 2013), some complete
summaries regarding mathematical models, pricing methods, optimization for-
mulation and future extensions are described. An interesting program to in-
duce DR is via incentive payment (an indirect control) by using a technique
called Peak Time Rebate (PTR) (Vuelvas and Ruiz, 2017, 2015; Mohajeryami et al.,
2016a; Severin Borenstein, 2014), where customers receive electricity bill re-
bates by not consuming (relative to a previously established, household-specific
baseline) during peak periods. In PTR, the baseline is a vital concept since
the payment depends on the calculation of estimated consumption, namely, a
counterfactual model must be developed. In (Mohajeryami et al., 2016a), some
methods are explained to estimate the customer baseline. A randomized con-
trolled trial method is developed in order to establish customer baseline load,
applied to aggregated forms of the consumption load in (Mohajeryami et al.,
2016b). The critical facts on the selection of customer baseline is shown in
(Chao, 2011), authors design a suitable baseline focusing on administrative
and contractual approaches in order to get an efficient DR. Furthermore, in
(Faria et al., 2013; Wijaya et al., 2014; Antunes et al., 2013), the performance
of DR baseline estimation models is studied and new methods are regarded as
establishing the reasonable compensation for the consumer.
The co-existence of a variety of generation technologies is an interesting
problem from a gaming point of view and even more with the integration
of DR into the electricity market. In (Genc and Thille, 2008), the compe-
tition between hydro and thermal electricity generators under uncertainty
over demand and water flows is presented. The authors in (Garcia et al.,
2005) analyze the price-formation in an oligopoly model where hydroelec-
tric generators are involved in dynamic Bertrand competition. Furthermore,
in (Villar and Rudnick, 2003), a model to understand a hydrothermal electric
power market is built based on simple bids to the SO. Moreover, in (Zhu et al.,
2013), by means of Stackelberg game is illustrated what is the value that DR
management can bring to generation companies and consumers in a smart grid.
In (Su and Kirschen, 2009), a method is devised for quantifying the effect of
the demand response for the market as a whole.
The agents involved in an electricity market in competition with DR are
shown in Fig. 1. In this paper, SO is responsible for arbitrage services in
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order to establish a proper environment for competition and gaming. The
generators have different technologies, costs, revenues, and each firm seeks to
maximize its profit (the difference between producers’ revenue and costs). Fur-
thermore, the aggregators carry out the request to users of reducing energy
consumption, namely, DR process. The main goal is to estimate the equilib-
rium price under gaming environment. This competition is less than perfect,
some firms are able to influence the market price through their actions. Such
optimization problems set up which is called in game theory a non-cooperative
game (Vega Redondo, 2003; Gabriel et al., 2013; Tirole, 1988; Osborne, 1995;
Varian, 1992). The solution of such a game is called a Nash equilibrium and
represents a market equilibrium under imperfect competition.
In this paper, a game among generators with different technologies in an
electricity market is analyzed if DR is required when the demand side exceed
a defined threshold a priori by SO in order to guarantee some objectives of a
smart grid. This threshold is determined from all customer baseline load and
desired energy reduction during peak times. Then, a novel demand curve is
proposed in order to understand the effect of electricity market behavior when
an incentive-based DR program, like PTR, is held to diminish the energy
consumption at the peak periods.
Generator 1
Generator 2
Generator ng
Aggregator 1
Aggregator 2
Aggregator nd
Market
Industrial
Residential
Commercial
competition
D
em
a
n
d
Fig. 1 Gaming in the electricity market. Where ng and nd are the total number of gener-
ators and aggregators in the electricity market, respectively.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
– A novel incentive-based DR model is proposed. Demand function is formu-
lated by using a sigmoid function between two linear polynomials to depict
the energy threshold when DR is required. This formulation is a continuous
function with finite marginal value in the demand curve. In particular, it is
an alternative modeling of DR to (Su and Kirschen, 2009), where, the de-
mand curve has two parts: perfect inelastic behavior and price responsive
consumers. The inconvenience of (Su and Kirschen, 2009) is that demand
does no have perfect inelastic role since the consumers have a limited will-
ingness to pay.
– A Nash-Cournot equilibrium is formulated as a complementary problem in
the presence of DR (Gabriel et al., 2013). The generators compete without
a centralized program. Cournot gaming is compared when an electricity
market operates normally and when an incentive-based DR is active during
peak times.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the agent
models in an electricity market. Section III, the problem formulation as Cournot
Competition in the presence of DR is developed. Numerical results are de-
scribed in Section IV. Discussion is presented in Section V. Finally, conclusions
are drawn in Section VI.
2 Agent models
In this section, a novel demand model is proposed for studying an incentive-
based DR program within an electricity market. This formulation illustrates
the wholesale market behavior during a day. In addition, generator models are
posed under Cournot Competition.
2.1 Demand response model
The most important decision unit of microeconomic theory is the demand
(Varian, 1992; Mas-Colell et al., 1995). In this section, a new approach for
modeling the demand is posed when consumers participate in an incentive-
based DR program. Let T = {1, 2, ..., nt} be the set of periods to take into
account in the horizon time, where nt is last hour, that is, nt = 24. An aggre-
gated demand is considered for this DR rebate model. The decision-maker’s
preferences are specified by giving smooth utility function G(qt), where qt
is the energy consumption at time t. G(qt) depicts the level of satisfaction
obtained by the demand as a function of the total power consumption.The
utility function satisfies the following properties as proposed in (Chen et al.,
2012; Samadi et al., 2012; Fahrioglu and Alvarado, 2000; Vega Redondo, 2003;
Osborne, 1995):
Property 1: G(qt) is assumed as a concave function with respect to qt. This
implies that the marginal benefit of users is a nonincreasing function.
d2G(qt)
dq2t
≤ 0 ∀t ∈ T
Property 2: The marginal benefit is nonnegative.
dG (qt)
dqt
≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
Property 3: G(qt) is zero when the consumption level is zero.
G (0) = 0 ∀t ∈ T
The market price is p∗t at the time t. The superscript star indicates the
equilibrium price. For each generator, the cost function is assumed increasing
with respect to the total energy production capacity. In addition, the cost
function is strictly convex. Then, other definitions are considered as follows.
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Definition 1 The demand energy total cost is pi(qt) = p
∗
t qt.
Definition 2 G(qt) is approximated by a second order polynomial around
qt, ∀t ∈ T . In general, a quadratic function is considered.
G (qt) = −
γt
2
(qt − qt)
2
+ p∗t (qt − qt) + k ∀t ∈ T
being k = qt
(
γt
2 qt + p
∗
t
)
a constant value, obtained by Property 3.
Definition 3 The payoff function is defined as Ut (qt) = G(qt)− pi(qt), which
indicates the user benefit of consuming qt energy during the interval t.
Basically, incentive-based DR programs request customers for curtailing
demand in response to a price signal or economic incentive. Typically the
invitation to reduce demand is made for a specific time period or peak event.
There are some concepts in order to define DR rebate program:
Definition 4 Baseline (βt): the amount of energy the user would have con-
sumed in the absence of a request to reduce (counterfactual model) (Deng et al.,
2015). This quantity can not be measured, then this is estimated from the
previous consumption of the agent. In this work, the aggregated baseline cor-
responds to the sum of all customer baseline loads in order to propose a DR
threshold required in the electricity market.
qt is the actual use, namely, the amount of energy that aggregated demand
actually consumes during the event period.
Definition 5 Load Reduction (△t (βt, qt)): the difference between the base-
line and the actual use.
βt − qt = △t
In incentive-based DR programs, the rebate is only received if there is an
energy reduction. Otherwise, the user does not get any incentive or penalty.
Mathematically,
Definition 6 Let p2 be the rebate price received by the demand due to energy
reduction in peak periods. The DR incentive pi2 is given by,
pi2 (qt; p2t, βt) =
{
p2t△t = p2t(βt − qt) qt < βt
0 qt ≥ βt
∀t ∈ T
Next, the demand payoff function with DR rebate program is written as:
Uˆt (qt; p2t, βt) = G(qt)− pi(qt) + pi2(qt; p2t, βt) ∀t ∈ T (1)
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In this paper, the inverse demand function is formulated to develop the
Cournot’s model of oligopoly. The inverse demand function is given by pt (qt) =
dUt(qt)
dqt
. Where pt (qt) is the price function at the time t.
Accordingly, the inverse demand function without DR is obtained from
definition 3. Next, the linear inverse demand function is derived as follows.
pt (qt) = −γtqt + γtqt ∀t ∈ T (2)
Whether the demand payoff function with DR is considered when qt < βt,
then the inverse demand function is given by,
p˜t (qt) = −γtqt + (γtqt − p2t) ∀t ∈ T (3)
In order to model the electricity market with DR during peak hours, a
sigmoid function between both inverse demand functions (Eq. (2) and Eq. (3))
is proposed. Fig. 2 (a) depicts a novel demand function that models incentive-
based DR at market level. The novel inverse demand function is presented as
follows.
pˆt (qt) = −γtqt +
(
γtqt −
p2t
1 + eα(−qt+ξ)
)
∀t ∈ T (4)
where α is a constant value which represents the smoothness of the sigmoid
function that joins the two straight lines and ξ is the threshold level to perform
the DR process.
Notice that this demand model represents a preference alteration of consumers.
Fig 2 (b) shows the case when the supply curve is intersected by demand
curve for qt > βt. The equilibrium price pˆt
∗ is less than the energy price given
by the inverse demand function pt (qt). In addition, the energy consumption
decreases to qˆt
∗ owing to the incentive price pi2, which is requested by setting
the threshold ξ. The incentive is paid to consumers when the DR program is
required. Besides, SO determines the threshold ξ according to the available
energy (water reservoirs, fuels, etc.), the estimated baseline βt and the energy
consumption patterns. Then aggregators encourage customers for carrying out
the energy reduction.
In (Su and Kirschen, 2009), the demand model has two parts: consumers
that have perfect inelastic behavior, they are represented by an infinite marginal
value; and users that participate in a DR program, they can place bid price
with a finite marginal value in the demand curve. However, the drawback of
the proposal (Su and Kirschen, 2009) is that demand does not have perfect
inelastic behavior because the consumers have a limit willingness for energy
payment. In this paper, demand always has a finite marginal value, hence, this
model is an alternative to represent the DR behavior in an electricity market.
2.2 Supply model
The relationship between total energy from all generators and price lead to
make the supply curve. In this work, producers try to anticipate the results
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γtqt − p2t
ξ
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Fig. 2 Inverse demand function.
of their actions on the price, then the market experiences imperfect compe-
tition. SO has arbitrage services, commands DR threshold, and manages the
transmission assets as its functions into the electricity market. Therefore, each
generator seeks independently to maximize its own economic benefits. The
profit is given by its revenue from sold energy minus the cost of generating
it. Two kinds of power suppliers are considered: thermal generators are rep-
resented with quadratic costs and hydropower are formulated with fixed costs
(Genc and Thille, 2008).
2.2.1 Thermal generation modeling
The thermal cost is given by an increasing quadratic function. Let rta be the
power generated by producer a ∈ A at the period t, where A is the set of
thermal generators. Thus, the costs have the following form: c1arta+
c2a
2 r
2
ta+
c3a, being c1a, c2a and c3a constant values that depict private information.
These quadratic costs are stated because thermal power has an expensive
economic behavior (Genc and Thille, 2008). In this sense, each generator uses
its knowledge of the inverse demand function (pt (qt) or pˆt (qt)) to anticipate
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its own effect on the market price in order to maximize its profit. Then, the
optimization problem for thermal generator is posed as follows.
max
∑
t∈T
[
pt (qt) rta −
(
c1arta +
c2a
2 r
2
ta + c3a
)]
s.t. rta ≤ r
+
a : µ
T
ta ∀t ∈ T
rta ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
(5)
where r+a is the maximum value of the energy that each thermal power can
generate in each period. µTta is dual variable for the first constraint. This model
does not consider ramp constraint, minimum uptime and downtime, among
other constraints.
2.2.2 Hydropower modeling
Hydropower is included in competition into the electricity market. The hydro
generator has a production function Htb(wtb) which represents the conversion
of water release to energy, where wtb is the water release of hydro reservoir
for each generator b ∈ B. For this kind of producer, a fixed cost c4b is for-
mulated. Hence, the optimization problem is to maximize the profits by each
hydropower.
max
∑
t∈T [pt (qt)Htb(wtb)− c4b]
s.t. wtb ≤ w
+
tb : µ
H
tb ∀t ∈ T
wtb ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
(6)
where w+tb is the maximum value of the water release at the time t for the
generator b. µHtb is dual variable for the first constraint.
3 Incentive-based demand response in Cournot competition
A Cournot competition is developed for studying the proposed DR model that
is described in section 2. This model assumes that generators cannot collude
or form a cartel, and they seek to maximize their own profit based on demand
model. This section describes the game between market participants in order
to settle the energy price by solving simultaneously the optimization problems
(5) and (6), as presented in (Gabriel et al., 2013). Now, the definition of Nash
equilibrium is stated as follows.
Definition 7 Considering the game G =
〈
I, {Si}i=1,2,..ni. , {ψi}i=1,2,...,ni.
〉
,
where I is the players set, Si is the strategies set of each player and ψi :∏
i∈I Si → R is the utility function of each generator. (s
∗
1, ...s
∗
i ) is a Nash
equilibrium whether ∀i ∈ I player is true that: ψi
(
s∗i , s
∗
−i
)
≥ ψi
(
si, s
∗
−i
)
,
∀si ∈ Si, being s−i all strategies except the player i (Vega Redondo, 2003).
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Remark 1 Nash equilibrium has two interpretations: s∗i is the best response
to s∗
−i or it does not exist unilateral incentives to deviate from Nash equi-
librium. Furthermore, an equilibrium problem can be solved using Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of several interrelated optimization problem
(Gabriel et al., 2013).
First, the aim is to solve Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) in the case when no demand
response is required, i.e, using the demand model pt (qt) given by Eq. (2).
Next, the situation when DR is requested, Eq. (4) is used as demand model
given by the threshold defined by SO. In order to find the solution, the KKT
conditions of each agent are solved simultaneously. In particular, if DR is
applied then the demand side shifts its energy requirement during the day
in order to maintain its preferences and satisfaction levels, therefore, balance
constraints are included in this case to model this behavior, namely,
∑
t∈T rt+
Ht = Dn is added to the optimization problem, being Dn the estimated net
demand without DR.
In this paper, a duopoly is assumed for understanding the effect of the
proposed DR model. In particular, two generators are employed to find the
Nash-Cournot equilibrium: one thermal energy producer and one hydropower
according to the suggested supply curve from Section 3. For simplicity, the
subscript a and b from Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) are removed because there is
one generator per technology. Therefore, the net energy consumption is qt =
rt + Ht(wt) for each t ∈ T . The KKT conditions with and without DR are
presented in the next Section.
3.0.1 Electricity market without demand response
First, considering the case when DR is not required in the market. The KKT
conditions are rewritten as complementary model by using Eq. (2) which are
shown below.
0 ≤ rt (2γt + c2) + (γtHt (wt) + c1)− γtqt + µ
T
t ⊥ rt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
0 ≤ µTt ⊥ r
+ − rt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
(7)
0 ≤ dHt(wt)
dwt
[γtrt + 2γtHt (wt)− γtqt] + µ
H
t ⊥ wt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
0 ≤ µHt ⊥ w
+
t − wt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
(8)
where (7) and (8) are the resulting conditions for thermal generation and
hydropower, respectively. Note that Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) do not have intercon-
nected periods since each hour of a day has energy consumption requirement
which is depicted by an independent demand model.
3.0.2 Electricity market with demand response
Next, the KKT conditions are presented as follows when the market has an
incentive command by reducing energy consumption given by the demand
model from Eq. (4).
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0 ≤ lr + p2t
eα(rt+Ht(wt))[eα(rt+Ht(wt))+eαξ(αrt+1)]
[eα(rt+Ht(wt))+eαξ]
2 + rt (2γt + c2)
+ (γtHt (wt) + c1)− γtqt + µ
T
t ⊥ rt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
0 ≤ µTt ⊥ r
+ − rt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T∑
t∈T rt +Ht = Dn, lr free
(9)
0 ≤ lh +
dHt(wt)
dwt
[
p2t
eα(rt+Ht(wt))[eα(rt+Ht(wt))+eαξ(αHt(wt)+1)]
[eα(rt+Ht(wt))+eαξ]
2
]
+ dHt(wt)
dwt
[γtrt + 2γtHt (wt)− γtqt] + µ
H
t ⊥ wt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
0 ≤ µHt ⊥ w
+
t − wt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T∑
t∈T rt +Ht = Dn, lh free
(10)
where (9) and (10) are the KKT conditions for thermal generation and
hydropower if DR is applied, respectively. lr and lh are the dual variables
associated to balance constraints for thermal generation and hydropower, cor-
respondingly. For this case, a balance constraint between all periods is added
to model the shift in energy load that consumers perform to maintain their
activities or their comfort levels during a day.
4 Numerical results
The analysis of numerical examples involves three aspects: the effect of de-
mand response, the study of consumer and generator surplus and the effect
on the incentive variation. The simulation is performed in GAMS 24.7.4 using
PATH as the solver.
In Table 1, the simulation parameters are shown in order to illustrate the new
approach of demand model with DR given by Eq. (4). The simulation data are
based on (Forouzandehmehr et al., 2014; Genc and Thille, 2008; Cunningham et al.,
2002).
First, the Cournot competition between generators without DR is shown.
Fig. 3 depicts the results of gaming between thermoelectric and hydroelectric
when the inverse demand function is given by Eq. (2). The equilibrium en-
ergy versus hours in a day are depicted in Fig. 3 according to the generator
technology and the total electrical energy delivered to customers. Simulations
are made in a 24-hour horizon. Hydropower has the main participation in the
market due to it does not have the variable cost, therefore, it is cheaper than
the thermal generation. The peak time occurs between 19 to 21 hours. Lastly,
the net demand for all periods without DR is Dn = 25476.4MWh.
Next, Fig. 4 presents the competition case when there is an incentive com-
mand if the energy consumption is greater than the threshold ξ = 1000MWh.
Below this value, the DR benefits do not apply. For instance, notice that the
total energy delivered at the hour 20 is about 1351MWh in Fig. 3, i.e., above
the baseline. As long as, in Fig. 4, the energy value at the same time is around
1046MWh, therefore, the energy reduction is approximately 305MWh since
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T = {1, 2, 3, ..., 24} h ξ = 1000MWh, Ht(wt) = wt, α = 0.1
c1 = 10 $
γt = {0.065, 0.067, 0.063, 0.063, 0.06,
0.065, 0.062, 0.068, 0.065, 0.067, 0.063, 0.067,
0.068, 0.069, 0.062, 0.061, 0.067, 0.067, 0.055,
0.054, 0.055, 0.065, 0.063, 0.061} $
MWh2
c2 = 0.025 $
γtqt = {92.4, 93.82, 95.67, 99.2, 95.32, 94.56,
90.56, 91.14, 90.19, 92.23, 91.45, 95.7,
104.45, 103.13, 101.54, 91.87, 103.95, 95.23,
120.19, 120.35, 120.23, 108.4, 95.67, 95.67} $
MWh
c3 = 0 $
p2t = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 20, 20, 20, 0, 0, 0} $
MWh
c4 = 0 $ r+ = 500MWh, w+t = 1000
acre−ft
h
∀t ∈ T
Table 1 Simulation parameters.
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Fig. 3 Cournot competition without demand response.
the demand behavior is altered by the incentive payment given by the defi-
nition 6. In addition, the reduction proportion is similar for each technology.
For this case, Dn = 25476.4MWh is used as estimated demand to solve Eq
(9) and Eq. (10). Hence, the net demand is the same for both situations. If
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Fig. 4 Cournot competition with demand response.
DR is employed, consumers shift energy consumption to an off period in order
to maintain their satisfaction level.
4.1 The effect of demand response
In Fig. 5, the effect of DR in terms of energy is shown. Whether the consump-
tion is higher than the threshold value (ξ = 1000MWh) and if the period
has reduction incentive then the DR model stimulates the consumers to re-
duce the energy consumption patterns. This behavior is found because the
economic incentive p2t is introduced on the inverse demand function. Thus,
this incentive payment can be understood as an alteration of consumer pref-
erences made by SO, to alleviate the system in contingency situations where
an energy reduction is required in the grid operation. For this example, the
cutback during peak times is about 21.5%. This percentage changes accord-
ing to the threshold selected by SO. Furthermore, demand shifts the energy
requirement to other periods to hold the same activities during the day by
increasing energy consumption at off-peak times.
In Fig. 6, the effects of the DR in term of prices is depicted. The fashion in
which a consumer reduces his energy is through economic stimulus or incen-
tives. Under this program, consumers are rewarded by a reduction of load in
peak hours. Fig. 6 shows that DR reduces the market prices since obeying the
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Fig. 5 The effect of the demand response in energy.
law of supply and demand for all periods. However, for obtaining the energy
reduction, SO must pay an economic incentive in order to motivate the load
curtailment by consumers. Therefore, in certain events, the incentive-based
DR is a reasonable alternative to overcome contingency scenarios in the elec-
tric power system. At these times, it is more cost-effective to diminish demand
than to increase supply or induce power outages to maintain the balance in
the electrical grid.
4.2 Consumer and producer surplus
Consumer and generator surplus are shown in Fig. 7. The producer surplus
is calculated from the objective functions (Eq. (5) and Eq. (8)). Whereas the
consumer surplus is obtained by replacing directly the inverse demand function
(4) in
∫ qt
0 pt (E
′) dE′ − p∗t qt. An important feature of the incentive-based DR
program is that the generators decrease their profit or surplus when DR is
required. This effect is due to the reduction performed by users, in which,
the prices are affected by the inverse demand curve stated when the energy
exceeds the threshold. Moreover, consumers are rewarded by a reduction in
their energy bill whether they reduce their consumption. Therefore, users have
a greater economic surplus with DR program than not participating, taking
into account the previous definitions for this model.
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Fig. 6 The effect of demand response in prices.
In Fig. 8, the generator surplus by technology is illustrated. Hydropower
has the major participation in the electricity market, therefore, it suffers the
greatest reduction in its benefits. Whereas that thermoelectric reduces slightly
its profit. In general, the energy reduction depends on the participation of each
generator in the energy market. For instance, 30.4% and 23.8% are the reduc-
tion percentages of hydroelectric and thermoelectric at 20 hour, respectively.
4.3 Incentive effect in demand response
For analyzing the incentive effect in this kind of DR program, the simulation
parameters are set in γt = 0.054 $/MWh
2 and γtqt = 120.35 $/MWh for one
period. Next, the aim is to change the incentive price in order to understand
what happens to the energy cutback, market price, and participant surplus.
In Fig. 9, the percentage energy reduction and the market price are shown ac-
cording to the incentive. The immediate effect of DR is to decrease the electric
power requirement and, by the law of supply and demand, the market price
declines as increases the incentive signal. For instance, whether the incentive
price p2t is equal to 10 $/MWh, then the market price is 43.67 $/MWh and
the energy reduction is 8.6%.
Fig. 10 illustrates the generation and demand surplus as increases the in-
centive price. The amount of energy to be dispatch is less when DR is required.
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Then, the generation profit diminishes also caused by decreasing market prices.
Therefore, the main achievement of this incentive-based DR program is to
guarantee the power availability in peak events or to provide a solution to
a contingency situation, e.g., low water levels in reservoirs of hydroelectric
power. Furthermore, consumers perceive more economic benefits when they
are participating in the DR program since the net price is cheaper whether
they reduce their consumption. For example, if the incentive price is 10$/MWh
then users notice an increase about 3.8% of their surplus, while, the generation
has a decrease around 16.1% of the profit.
5 Discussion
Incentive-based DR is a program where consumers receive incentive payment
according to a counterfactual model, namely, they are rewarded by a price
multiplied by energy reduction which is measured from household baselines.
Therefore, this quantity is estimated by SO from previous energy consump-
tion. During peak times, SO evaluates the demand forecast (baseline), power
availability, transmission constraints, costs of power outages, among others in
order to define if DR procedure is required.
The proposed model allows a SO to know the market behavior in an imperfect
environment to take decisions when an indirect DR method is employed. This
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model includes a threshold which can be interpreted as a guide or reference
value of the expected energy reduction during peak time at market level. In
addition, the threshold can be derived or estimated from the subset of con-
sumers that are willing to participate in DR. This information can be collected
by aggregators and analyzed by SO.
Economic policy is focused on how to define the incentive signal to determine
a trade-off between agent surplus, grid constraints, and market objectives. For
instance, under this model, the following question could be assessed: where
does the incentive come from? This could be addressed by adding a fixed cost
to the market price so that it can be used to encourage consumers to reduce
their energy consumption in a contingency situation. Moreover, most of the
literature is concentrated on directly studying DR at distribution side without
considering all effects in the system as a whole. Therefore, this model provides
tools to determine choices on indirect DR methods in electricity markets.
This new price responsive demand structure is an economic tool for analyz-
ing DR programs in imperfect markets. In addition, this approach can be
extended to study the operation of centralized systems which could result in
the following benefits: price responsive demand can make the power market
more competitive during peak times; it also can improve the predictability of
demand requirements and could provide rapid response to emergency short-
age conditions; finally, it can postpone the need for generation investment and
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Fig. 9 Energy reduction and market price affected by the DR incentive.
delay the need for certain transmission upgrades by decelerating the growth
in peak demand.
6 Conclusions
In this work was developed an analysis of Cournot competition in an incentive-
based DR program. A new demand curve was proposed for modeling consumer
preferences in order to include DR in the electricity market. Incentives for con-
sumers were considered as the DR program. The demand model was devised
as a composition of two linear functions and a sigmoid, which represents an
energy threshold for analyzing the load reduction in this kind of DR programs.
It was found that the incentive-based DR is a cost-effective solution to reduce
energy consumption during peak times. However, this program affects nega-
tively the generator surplus under competition environment.
The proposed model can be employed to study price responsive demand in
wholesale electricity markets where consumers have the opportunity to reduce
voluntary their consumption according to incentive signals. Particularly, price
response characteristic can enable development of enhanced operational sys-
tems to take advantage of the predictable behavior of short term consumption
patterns that are associated with wholesale price conditions. For instance, the
model can work as decision-making tool for grid operators to defer more ex-
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Fig. 10 Generation and demand surplus behavior according to the incentive price
pensive dispatch options and reduce transmission congestion costs.
For future works, transmission and intertemporal constraints can be incor-
porated into the model in order to take into account all characteristic of a
dispatch problem. Additionally, a significant improvement would be to model
the demand curve as a random process for studying the electrical grid behavior
when renewable energies are integrated in the distribution system.
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